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Abstract. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Process on a graph G is an iterative process where each vertex, with
a fixed strategy (cooperate or defect), plays the game with each of its neighbours. At the end of a round
each vertex may change its strategy to that of its neighbour with the highest pay-off. Here we study the
spread of cooperative and selfish behaviours on a toroidal grid, where each vertex is initially a cooperator
with probability p. When vertices are permitted to change their strategies via a randomized asynchronous
update scheme, we find that for some values of p the limiting density of cooperators may be modelled as a
polynomial in p. Theoretical bounds for this density are confirmed via simulation.
1. Introduction and Preliminaries
The particular topology of a network has a dramatic impact on discrete processes that model competitive
interactions in communities [11]. For example, spread of a particular attitude or belief is less likely to
propagate completely in Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs than on small-world networks [4]. Studies of Cellular Automata
indicate that the particular updating scheme impacts the limiting configuration of randomly seeded cellular
automaton [15]. Here we combine these two paradigms to study a discrete-time process that may be modelled
as a cellular automata with a particular updating scheme.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma, a staple of classical game theory, is a 2-player game in which each of the two
players simultaneously make a decision to either cooperate or defect. Each of the players receives a pay-off
whose amount takes into account the decisions of both players. The pay-off structure is chosen so that each
player’s pay-off is maximised when both choose cooperate and so that a player’s pay-off is minimized when
they choose cooperate and the other player chooses to defect. Classically the game is played in a single round.
However by considering the game as being played in a series of rounds, the Prisoner’s Dilemma may be used
to model a variety of scenarios in many disciplines, including evolutionary biology [18, 7], economics [19, 9]
and sociology [10, 17]. More broadly, the Prisoner’s Dilemma on graphs fits in the context of evolutionary
games on graphs. A survey of methods and research in this area is given in [20].
Here we consider the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma as a game played between neighbours on a graph. In each
round each vertex plays, with a fixed strategy (cooperate or defect), the game with each of its neighbours.
The score for each vertex is the sum of the pay-offs its receives in each game. At the end of each round, each
vertex is given the opportunity to update their strategy to that of their most successful neighbour.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma on the grid was first examined by Nowak and May [12]. Through simulation they
find that spatial effects have an impact on the evolution of the strategies of players in the process. In
examining symmetric configurations they find “dynamical fractals” and “evolutionary kaleidoscopes”. In
this early work, the authors consider an update scheme in which each of the vertices update simultaneously
to emulate the strategy of their most successful neighbour. This updating scheme has been examined on
a variety of different graphs, in particular regular lattices, random graphs and small-world networks. For
example, Abramson and Kuperman observe a number of properties of a Prisoner’s Dilemma process for
regular lattices and random graphs [2]; Dura´n and Mulet observe a relationship between initial and final
density of cooperators on random graphs when the graph has small connectivity [8]; Santos et al. consider
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how the preferential model of attachment in random graphs provide sufficient conditions for the cooperator
strategy to propagate [14].
In much of the previous work in this area, the authors consider a deterministic model of updating in which
all of the vertices simultaneously emulate the strategy of their most successful neighbour. However, other
update schemes are possible. In [21] the authors use a probabilistic process as part of the updating strate-
gies. In addition to synchronous updating schemes, i.e., those in which all vertices update simultaneously,
asynchronous schemes may be studied. In their survey of evolutionary games on graphs [20], Szabo´ and
Fa´th consider the update model in which a pair of neighbouring vertices are chosen at random, with one
emulating the strategy of the other according to some random variable.
A study of asynchronous update schemes of cellular automata by Cornforth et al. shows that the particular
variant of asynchronous update has a dramatic effect on the limiting behaviour of one dimensional cellular
automata [5]. They further highlight the differences between deterministic and probabilistic asynchronous
update schemes. A full survey of asynchronous update schemes in cellular automata is given in [6]. The
model of asynchronous probabilistic updating presented here provides a new direction in both the study of
cellular automata and evolutionary games on graphs. We propose a variation of the random independent
model of updating that considers the set of vertices envious of their neighbours and updates them in a
random order, playing a round of the game after each individual vertex has updated. This update scheme
behaves similarly to the random independent model for updating cellular automata [15]; however, it provides
necessary structure to facilitate proofs of observed behaviours.
We note that in many of these previous works, much of the work has been strictly experimental. That is,
emergent behaviours are observed through carefully designed computer simulation. A notable exception to
this is the work of Schweitzer et al. [16], whose analysis allows for a verification of the simulations originally
presented by Nowak and May. Here we break from this trend to provide theoretical justifications for observed
behaviours.
In this paper we study the resulting behaviour of the Prisoner’s Dilemma process on toroidal grids where
each vertex of the grid cooperates with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Figure 2 gives examples of starting and the
resulting stable configurations for various values of p. Here we notice that, though the initial configuration is
randomised, the resulting stable configuration exhibits a surprising amount of structure. While the update
process introduces uncertainty through the choice of the permutation of the envious vertices, we find that
for some values of p, we may predict the density of cooperators as t → ∞. In Section 3 we consider the
growth of small clusters existing in infinite grids. We use the results from Section 3 in Section 4 to derive
probabilistic bounds on the final density of cooperators on the n× n toroidal grid for a fixed value of p, and
for p as a function of n.
2. Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A configuration, C, is a function that assigns a strategy to each vertex of G.
Formally, C : V → {0, 1}, where 0 corresponds to defector and 1 corresponds to cooperator. The pay-off
function, f , assigns the score for the first player to an ordered pair that represents the strategies of the first
and second player. The pay-off function f : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1, T} is given by
PPPPPPPC(v1)
C(v2) 0 1
0 0 T
1 0 1
where T > 1 is a fixed constant. We refer to T as the cheating advantage.
Let C be fixed and let v ∈ V (G). The score of v with respect to C is given by
s(v) =
∑
x∈N(v)
f(C(v), C(x)).
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Figure 1. An example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Process with Random Asynchronous Updating
When the context is clear we refer to the score of v. The most successful neighbours of v are the vertices in
the closed neighbourhood of v (denoted N [v]) that have the greatest score. We restrict our consideration for
possibilities for the value T in such a way that each of the most successful neighbours have the same strategy.
Let u be a most successful neighbour of v. The vertex v is called weak with respect to C if C(v) 6= C(u).
Otherwise, we say that v is strong. In other words, weak vertices would like to change their strategy and
strong vertices are satisfied with their strategy. We are interested in the change in the configuration with
respect to time; we use Ct to denote the configuration at time t and st to denote the score at time t.
The configuration, D, resulting from updating v with respect to C changes the strategy of v if v is weak and
leaves the strategies of all other vertices fixed.
We call a maximal connected proper subgraph K of k vertices with the same strategy a k-cluster. We say
that a 1-cluster is an isolated vertex. The k-cluster H ≤ G has a border of width b if for all h ∈ V (H) and
all v ∈ V (G −H) such that C(h) = C(v), we have that d(h, v) ≥ b. That is, H is surrounded by a border
that b vertices wide that consists of vertices all with the opposite strategy.
Given a graph G and some T > 1, our process is initialised with C0, some configuration of the vertices. The
process proceeds as follows. Let Wt be the set of weak vertices with respect to Ct. If Wt = ∅, then the
process terminates. In this case we say that Ct is a stable configuration. Otherwise, we select with uniform
probability a permutation, σ, of the elements of Wt. Considering the permutation as a sequence of the
elements of Wt, we proceed through |Wt| subrounds. At the kth subround we update the kth vertex of the
sequence, vk, with respect to the current configuration (i.e., the configuration resulting from the (k − 1)th
subround). The configuration resulting from the |Wt|th subround is denoted Ct+1. We refer to the process
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma process on G with randomised asynchronous updating. Though, for brevity we
refer to this process as the PD process on G.
Let C be a configuration and σ a permutation of the elements of W . For any vertex x ∈ W we denote by
σ−1(x) the position of x in the sequence of elements of W induced by σ. Thus, x is updated in the σ−1(x)
subround.
As we are interested in the spread of the cooperative strategy, for any configuration we may consider the
density of cooperators. For configuration Ct, let rt be the density of cooperators at time t. If Ct is a stable
configuration, then we define the final density, denoted rf , to be rt.
We give an example on the 6× 6 grid to highlight how the choice of T for the process and the choice of the
updating permutation in a particular round affect the spread of strategies. Consider the configuration given
in Figure 1a. In our figures we use white squares for cooperators and grey squares for defectors.
If T = 53 each of the cooperators have score 2 and each of the labelled defectors have score
5
3 . All un-
labelled vertices have score 0, as they are defectors with no cooperator neighbours. Observe that W0 =
{v1, v2, . . . , v8}. Figure 1b gives the resulting configurations after applying σ1 = (v2, v3, v6, v7, v1, v4, v5, v8)
to C0 and alternatively applying σ2 = (v2, v4, v6, v8, v1, v3, v5, v7) to C0. In the first case, after subround 4, v1
is no longer a weak vertex, and so does not change strategy. The configuration C1 has no weak vertices and
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Figure 2
thus is stable. However, in the second case, v1 is a weak vertex after subround 4, and so does change from
being a cooperator to a defector. In this second case, the resulting configuration has eight weak vertices.
For T = 83 , each of the cooperators have score 2, and each of the labelled defectors have score
8
3 . All
unlabelled vertices have score 0, as they are defectors with no cooperator neighbours. Observe that W0 =
{u1, u2, u3, u4}. Regardless of the choice σ, Figure 1c is the resulting configuration after round 0.
A configuration Ct is called forced if Ct+1 will be the configuration regardless of the choice of σ at time
t. For a sequence C0, C1, . . . of configurations, we call the sequence resulting from removing the forced
configurations, and re-indexing, the basic sequence. We use the notation C ′0, C
′
1, . . . to refer to a basic
sequence and use the term basic time steps to refer to the time steps in a basic sequence.
In a 4-regular graph, if 1 < T < 43 , then the most successful neighbour of v is the vertex in the closed
neighbourhood of v with the most cooperator neighbours, with defectors taking precedence in the case of a
draw. For the remainder of this paper we consider only the case 1 < T < 43 as we restrict our study to the
toroidal grid. We use the notation T = 1 +  to refer to T in this range and use k +  to refer to a score
between k and k + 1. Thus, we say that a defector with k cooperator neighbours has score k + .
3. Evolution of Clusters of Cooperators and Defectors in Infinite Grids
In this section we consider the evolution of clusters situated in infinite grids. We apply these results in
Section 4 to study the behaviour of rt in the n× n toroidal grid.
Up to rotation and reflection of the plane, there is a single 1-cluster of defectors and a single 2-cluster of
defectors. A configuration of a single defector in an infinite grid of cooperators has exactly four weak vertices
– the neighbours of the single defector. By examining the number of cooperator neighbours, we see that
when one of these weak vertices has become a cooperator the resulting configuration is stable. Therefore a
1-cluster of defectors in an infinite field of cooperators evolves to a 2-cluster of defectors, which is a stable
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configuration. To show that the spread of a k-cluster of defectors in an infinite grid of cooperators is bounded,
we require the following results.
Proposition 1. For any sequence {Ct}t≥0 of configurations, no configuration Ct with t > 0 contains an
isolated defector.
Proof. It suffices to show that if C0 contains an isolated defector, then C1 does not, and if Ck does not
contain an isolated defector, then Ck+1 does not.
If v is an isolated defector in C0, then s(v) = 4T = 4 + . Since 4 +  is the maximum score that can be
attained by any vertex, any such v is strong and each of the four cooperators adjacent to such a v are weak.
Therefore during the first round, at least one vertex adjacent to v will become a defector.
Assume now that Ck does not contain an isolated defector and that v is an isolated defector in Ck+1. We
proceed with cases based on the strategy of v at the start of the round.
Case 1: v is a cooperator in Ck: Let σ be a permutation of Wk. Let x ∈ N [v] such that x is the last vertex
to change strategy of all vertices in N [v]. If x = v, then all neighbours are cooperators in the subround that
v changes. However, in this case v is not weak at the start of subround σ−1(x).
If x ∈ N(u), then it turned from defector to cooperator. In subround σ−1(x) it must be that the score of
v is 3 + . No neighbour of x that is a cooperator can have a neighbour that scores greater than 3. This
contradicts that x changes.
Case 2: v is a defector in Ck: Let x ∈ N(u) such that x is the last vertex to change strategy of all vertices
in N(u). This follows similarly to the previous case. 
For a configuration Ci, we say that a cooperator v is a persistent cooperator if Ct(v) = 1 for all t ≥ i.
Proposition 2. For any sequence {Ct}t≥0 of configurations, if a cooperator vertex v has four cooperator
neighbours in Ct, then v is a persistent cooperator.
Proof. By Proposition 1, st(u) ≤ 4 for all t > 0 and all u ∈ V , as cooperators have score at most 4 and
non-isolated defectors have score no more than 3+. If st(v) = 4, then v is a cooperator with four cooperator
neighbours. This implies that each vertex of N [v] is strong. Therefore if st(v) = 4, then st+1(v) = 4. 
Corollary 3. If v is a cooperator with no isolated defector at distance at most 2 in C0, then v is a persistent
cooperator.
In this case we say that v is a initial persistent cooperator
Together these results allow us to find a bound on the growth of a k-cluster of defectors in an infinite field
of cooperators.
Corollary 4. If C0 is the configuration of the infinite grid consisting of a k-cluster of defectors in a field
of cooperators such that the k-cluster is contained by a rectangle of length ` and width w, then there exists a
rectangle of length `+ 4 and width w + 4 so that the growth of the defector strategy is contained within this
rectangle.
Proof. Every cooperator at distance two from the cluster of defectors is an initial persistent cooperator. 
As we consider the evolution of k-clusters of cooperators in an infinite field of defectors we encounter some
cases for which there are no surviving cooperators. In this case, we say that the particular cluster evolves
to an empty cluster.
Up to symmetry of the plane, there is a single 1-cluster and a single 2-cluster. When placed in a sufficiently
large grid of defectors, each of these clusters evolves to an empty cluster after at most two time steps.
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Figure 3. Evolution of 3-clusters and 4-clusters of cooperators in an infinite field of defectors.
Up to rotation and reflection there are two species of 3-clusters: 3-lines and 3-corners. When placed in
a sufficiently large field of defectors, a 3-line evolves to a stable configuration containing a 5-cluster with
probability 1. A 3-corner evolves to a stable configuration containing a 5-cluster with probability 12 and to
an empty cluster with probability 12 . The evolution of these clusters is given in Figure 3a. Note that weak
vertices are indicated with a circle.
Up to rotation and reflection there are 5 species of 4-clusters: 4-lines, 4-corners, 4-hats, 4-turns, and 4-
squares (See Figure 3). A 4-hat stabilises to a stable 5-cluster with probability 1. However, for each of
the other configurations simulation suggests a non-zero probability of large growth. The evolution of these
clusters through a small number of iterations is given in Figure 3.
We wish to show that a 4-cluster in an infinite grid of defectors will eventually evolve to a stable configura-
tion. Though the growth of such clusters passes through many different configurations, we show that every
configuration in the sequence of basic configurations where C0 is a 4-cluster of cooperators in an infinite
field of defectors can be classified into one of eight types. We consider these types equivalent under rotation
and reflection. The width parameter of each type tells the number of columns that contain cooperators,
whereas the height parameter tells us how many cooperators are in the column with the greatest amount of
cooperators. A summary of the configurations is given in Table 1. We note that each of these configurations
is convex. That is, for any pair of cooperators contained in a cluster, there is a shortest path between them
that contains only cooperators.
We begin by defining four basic clusters, which take the form of skew rectangles.
The stable cluster of width w ≥ 3 and height h ≥ 3 (h ≡ 1 mod 2, w − h ≥ 0) consists of cooperators in w
columns. The first column (starting from the left) contains a single cooperator. The number of cooperators
increases by 2 in each subsequent column, until a column of height h is reached. These increasing columns
are aligned so that the previous column is vertically centred in the subsequent column. After the maximum
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Name Glyph No. Weak Vertices
Stable Cluster w,h 0
Doubly Even Cluster w,h 8
Adjacent Even Cluster w,h 4
Opposite Even Cluster w,h 4
Double Even Transit Cluster w,h,` 3
Adjacent Even Transit Cluster A w,h,` 3
Adjacent Even Transit Cluster B w,h,` 3
Adjacent Even Transit Cluster C w,h,` 3
Table 1. Summary of Defined Configurations
is reached, columns of height h repeat w− h ≥ 0 times so that there are w columns containing cooperators,
as shown in Figure 4a. These repeating columns of height h are offset in such a way so that a subsequent
column is one unit lower than the previous column Following these repeating columns are columns whose
heights decrease by 2 in each subsequent column until there is a column with a single cooperator. An example
is given in Figure 4a. Observe that such a configuration is stable when placed in an infinite field of defectors.
We use the symbol w,h to denote a stable cluster of width w and height h.
The doubly even cluster of height h ≥ 2 and width w ≥ 2 (h ≡ 1 mod 2, w−h+ 1 ≥ 0) is a cluster consisting
of cooperators in w columns. The first column (starting from the left) contains two cooperators. The number
of cooperators increase by 2 in each subsequent column, until a column of height h − 1 is reached. These
increasing columns are aligned so that the previous column is vertically centred in the subsequent column.
If w − h+ 1 = 0, then there a second column of height h− 1 aligned with the first column of height h− 1.
The heights of the columns then decrease by 2 in each subsequent column until there is a column with a
single cooperator. Otherwise if w − h + 1 > 0, then the column of height h − 1 is followed by w − h + 1
columns of height h. The first of these columns is aligned so that the top of this column aligns with the
column of height h− 1. Subsequent columns of height h are offset so a subsequent column is one unit lower
than the previous column. Following these repeating columns is a column of height h there is a column of
height h − 1. This column of height h − 1 is aligned so the bottom of this column is aligned with that of
the previous column. The heights of the columns then decrease by 2 in each subsequent column until there
is a column with a two cooperators. An example is given in Figure 4b. We use the symbol w,h to denote
the doubly even cluster of height h and width w. Observe that w,h has 8 weak vertices when placed in an
infinite field of defectors.
The opposite even cluster of height h ≥ 3 and width w ≥ 4 (h ≡ 0 mod 2, w−h ≥ 0) is a cluster of cooperators
in w columns. The first column (starting from the left) contains one cooperator. The number of cooperators
increases by 2 in each subsequent column, until h − 1 is reached. These increasing columns are aligned so
that the previous column is vertically centred in the subsequent column. If w − h = 0, then the column of
height h− 1 is followed by a second column of height h− 1. This second column of height h− 1 is aligned
with the previous column of height h− 1. The heights of the columns then decrease by 2 in each subsequent
column until there is a column with a single cooperator. Otherwise if w − h > 0, then the column of height
h − 1 is followed w − h columns of height h. The first of these is aligned so that the top of this column is
aligned with the top of the previous column of height h− 1. Subsequent columns of height h are offset so a
subsequent column is are one unit lower than the previous column. These columns of height h are followed
by a column of height h− 1. This column of height h− 1 is aligned with the bottom of the previous column
of height h. The heights of the columns then decrease by 2 in each subsequent column until there is a column
with a single cooperator. An example is given in Figure 4c. We use the symbol w,h to denote the opposite
even cluster of height h and width w. Observe that w,h has four weak vertices when placed in an infinite
field of defectors.
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(a) 11,9 (b) 11,9 (c) 10,6 (d) 10,8
Figure 4. Basic Clusters
The adjacent even cluster of height h ≥ 5 and width w ≥ 5 (h ≡ 0 mod 2) is a cluster of cooperators in w
columns. The first column (starting from the left) contains two cooperators. The number of cooperators
increases by 2 in each subsequent column, until a column of height h is reached. These increasing columns are
aligned so that so that the previous column is vertically centred in the subsequent column. These increasing
columns are followed by w − h columns of height h so that there are w columns containing cooperators, as
shown in Figure 4d . These repeating columns of height h are offset so that a subsequent column is are one
unit lower than the previous column. The repeating columns of height h are followed by a column of height
h − 1. This bottom of the column of height h − 1 is aligned with the bottom of the final column of height
h. The heights of the columns then decrease by 2 in each subsequent column until there is a column with a
single cooperator. An example is given in Figure 4d. We use the symbol w,h to denote the adjacent even
cluster of height h and width w. Observe that w,h has four weak vertices when placed in an infinite field
of defectors.
From these last two skew rectangular clusters, we define four transit clusters. These four transit clusters
arise by considering the evolution of the skew rectangular clusters placed in an infinite field of defectors.
Consider the cluster given in Figure 4d. We see a pair of weak vertices aligned vertically on the left side of
the figure and a pair of weak vertices aligned horizontally at the bottom of the figure. In the subsequent
round exactly one defector from each pair will turn to a collaborator. Assume that the upper weak vertex
on the left side of the figure and the left vertex on the bottom of the figure turn to collaborators in the
following round. In this case we see that the next three time-steps are forced, as the NW and SW side of
the cluster grow. Since the NW side is shorter than the SW side, when the next basic time-step is reached
the SW side has not yet been fully filled in. We can consider such a cluster as being formed from a copy
by adding some number of collaborators along one of the sides. In a similar way, we can also construct a
cluster from a copy of by adding collaborators along one of the sides.
The double even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` (1 ≤ ` < h2 ) is formed in two ways based
on the value of `. To describe this cluster, we must consider w,h placed in an infinite field of defectors.
Such a cluster has two pairs of weak vertices – those at the top of the cluster and those at the bottom of
the cluster. When ` = 1 the double even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` = 1 is formed by
changing the upper-right weak defector to a collaborator. We note that the double even transit cluster of
width w, height h and length ` = 1 has three weak vertices when placed in an infinite field of defectors. One
of these weak vertices, say x, has no weak neighbours. When 1 < ` < h2 we define this cluster inductively.
The double even transit cluster of width w, height h and length 1 < ` < h2 is formed from the the double
even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` − 1 by changing x to be a cooperator. We note that
the double even transit cluster of width w, height h and length 1 ≤ ` < h2 has three weak vertices when
placed in an infinite field of defectors. One of these weak vertices, say x, has no weak neighbours. We use
the symbol w,h,` to denote the double even transit cluster of width w, height h and length `.
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(a) 8,8,2 (b) 9,8,2 (c) 9,8,3 (d) 9,9,2
Figure 5. Transit Clusters
The following two transit clusters are formed from . Consider w,h placed in an infinite field of defectors.
Such a cluster has two pairs of weak vertices – those at the left of the cluster and those at the bottom of the
cluster. The two following clusters arise by adding, respectively, collaborators along the NW side and along
the SW side starting from the left side of the cluster.
The adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` of type A (resp. type B) (1 ≤ ` < h/2)
is formed in two ways based on the value of `. When ` = 1, the adjacent even transit cluster of width w,
height h and length ` = 1 of type A (resp. type B) is formed from w,h by changing the lower (resp. upper)
of the two weak vertices on the left side of the cluster to be collaborators. Observe that such a cluster has
three weak vertices. One of these weak vertices, say x, has no weak neighbours. For 1 < ` < h2 we define
this cluster inductively. The adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and length 1 < ` < h2 of type
A (resp. type B) is formed from an adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` − 1 of
type A (resp. type B) by changing x to be a cooperator. We note that the adjacent even transit cluster of
width w, height h and length 1 ≤ ` < h2 of type A (resp. type B) has three weak vertices when placed in
an infinite field of defectors. One of these weak vertices, say x, has no weak neighbours. We use the symbol
w,h,` (resp. w,h,`) to denote the adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` of type
A. See Figure 5c for an example.
Finally, we reach our ultimate transit cluster – the adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and
length ` of type C (0 ≤ ` < h/2, w, h ≡ 0 mod 2). We describe this cluster using the same methodology as
the basic clusters. This cluster consist of cooperators in w columns. We begin with the case ` = 0. The
first column (starting from the left) contains a single cooperator. The number of cooperators increases by 2
in each subsequent column, until a column of height h− 4 is reached. These increasing columns are aligned
so that so that the previous column is vertically centred in the subsequent column. This column of height
h − 3 is followed by a column of height h − 1. The column of height h − 3 is aligned with that of height
h− 1 so that the bottom of the column of height h− 3 is aligned with the vertex that is third from bottom
in the column of height h− 1. The column of height h− 1 is followed by a column of height h. The bottom
of the column of height h− 1 is aligned with the bottom of the column of height h. The column of height h
is then followed by w − h− 3 columns of height h. These repeating columns of height h are aligned so that
a subsequent column is one unit higher than a previous column. Following the repeating columns of height
h are columns whose heights decrease by 2 until a column of height 1 is reached. We note that adjacent
even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` = 0 of type C has three weak vertices when placed
in an infinite field of defectors. One of these vertices, say x, has no weak neighbours. For 1 ≤ ` < h2 we
define this cluster inductively. The adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and length 1 ≤ ` < h2
of type C is formed from the adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and length ` − 1 of type C
by changing x to be a cooperator. We note that the adjacent even transit cluster of width w, height h and
length 1 ≤ ` < h2 of type C has three weak vertices when placed in an infinite field of defectors. One of these
weak vertices, say x, has no weak neighbours. We use the symbol w,h,` to denote the adjacent even transit
cluster of width w, height h and length ` of type C. See Figure 5d for an example.
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Figure 6. Evolution of 8,7
Let D be the set of configurations listed above together with their reflections and rotations in the plane
across all possible values of w, h and `.
To show how transitions occur between elements of D, consider the sequences of configurations given in
Figure 6. Recall that elements of D are considered equivalent up to reflection and rotation. Examining
C0 we see that there are 4! updating permutations. Let u1 and u2 be the pair of horizontal weak vertices
so that u1 is to the left of u2, and v1 and v2 be the pair of vertical weak vertices so that v1 is above v2.
In considering the possible updating permutations we note that for each pair of adjacent weak vertices it
only matters which of the pair comes first. That is, the sequence u1, v1, u2, v2 will give the same resulting
configuration as u1, u2, v1, v2. By also considering the symmetries of the cluster, the 4! possible updating
sequences may be partitioned in the three equivalence classes. Sequences C,D and E give the resulting
sequence of configurations given by the equivalence classes with representative elements (permutations):
(u1, v1, u2, v2), (u2, v1, u2, v1) and (u2, v2, u1, v1), respectively. By analysing the equivalence classes, C and
D each occur with probability 14 , and E occurs with probability
1
2 . After proceeding through the forced
iterations, we see that in each case we arrive at an element of D. In particular, 8,7 transitions to
with probability 14 , to 8,9 with probability
1
4 and to 9,8,3 with probability
1
2 . We note that by a similar
analysis for other elements of D, if C ′i ∈ D, then C ′i+1 ∈ D.
Figure 7 gives a partial transition diagram for the elements of D. The transitions shown do not depend on
the particular values of w and h. For example, regardless of the values of w and h, an element of D of the
form w,h will transition to w+2,h+2 with probability
1
8 . However the transition of an element of the form
w,h will only transform to an element of the form w+1,h+1 (with probability
1
4 ) if w = h. From this
diagram we see that each element of D that is not a stable cluster can transition to a stable cluster after at
most 3 basic time-steps. Such a transition will occur with probability at least 18 . This fact is given by the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. If C ′i ∈ D, then with probability at least 18 either C ′i+1 = or C ′i+2 = or C ′i+3 = .
Figure 7 is constructed to show that regardless of the configuration in C ′i, it is possible that one of C
′
i+1, C
′
i+2
or C ′i+3 is . As such, there are transitions between elements of D that can be deduced, but are not shown
in Figure 7. For example if w = h then w,h transitions to w+2,h+2 with probability
3
4 . This transition,
and many others, are omitted from Figure 7 as they are not relevant to Lemma 5. As the omitted transitions
are both cumbersome to enumerate and do not aid in the analysis below, we shall refrain from enumerating
them.
Lemma 5 implies the following corollary about the termination of the PD process seeded with a 4-cluster of
cooperators in an infinite grid of defectors.
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Figure 7. Transitions between elements of D that do not depend on h and w
Corollary 6. If C0 is a 4-cluster of cooperators in an infinite grid of defectors, then the PD process termi-
nates with probability 1.
Proof. By Lemma 5, if C ′i 6= , then with probability at least 18 either C ′i+1 = or C ′i+2 = or C ′i+3 = .
Therefore the probability that the process has not stabilised before basic time step 3i is bounded above by
7
8
i → 0 as i→∞. 
Corollary 7. The growth of a 4-cluster of cooperators in an infinite field of defectors is contained within a
ball of radius 2i+ 4 with probability at least 1− 78
bi/3c
.
Proof. Consider the basic sequence C ′0, C
′
1, . . . , where C
′
0 is a 4-cluster of cooperators in an infinite field of
defectors. The probability that the process survives until time step 3i (with respect to the basic sequence)
is bounded above by 78
i
as if process survives to reach step k then it survives to reach step k + 3 with
probability at least 78 . Similarly, if the growth is contained in a ball of radius 2i+ 4, then the process must
have terminated before round i. Therefore the probability that the growth is contained within a ball of
radius 2i+ 4 is bounded below by the probability that the process terminates no later than basic time step
3i, which is bounded below by 1− 78
bi/3c
.

Corollary 7 allows us to provide a crude upper bound on the expected growth of a 4-cluster of cooperators
in an infinite field of defectors.
Theorem 8. If C0 is a 4-cluster of cooperators in an infinite field of defectors, then the expected number of
cooperators in a stable configuration is bounded above by∑
j>0
(
7
8
)j
1
8
(
(6j + 8)2 + (6j + 7)2
)
< 8919.
Proof. The probability that the process ends at C ′3j , C
′
3j+1 or C
′
3j+2 is bounded below by
7
8
j 1
8 . In round
C ′3j+2 the growth is contained in a ball of radius 2(3j+ 2) + 4 = 6j+ 8. The ball of radius 6j+ 8 in the grid
contains (6j + 8)2 + (6j + 7)2 vertices. 
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We note that, though the sum in Theorem 8 does converge, the value is much more than the actual growth
of a 4-cluster as observed in simulations. This bound may be improved by observing that in the first few
configurations appears very frequently. When C ′i = the process terminates at C
′
i+1 with probability
1
2 . Further, the assumption that between C
′
i and C
′
i+1 each of the height and width grow by 2 is not true,
unless C ′i = , otherwise the sum of the height and width grows by at most 2.
4. Growth in the Toroidal Grid
Recall the following important tools of probability theory [3].
Markov’s Inequality: If X is a random variable such that X > 0, then Pr(X ≥ a) ≤ E(X)a .
Chebyshev’s Inequality: If X is a random variable such that X > 0, then Pr(|X − E(X)|) > a) ≤ V ar(X)a2 .
Additionally, consider the following definitions from the study of asymptotic analysis
An event E in some probability space parametrised by n holds asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) if
Pr(E = 1)→ 1 as n→∞.
Let f, g : Z → R. We say that f is much smaller than g, denoted f  g, if f(n)g(n) → 0 as n → ∞. We say
that f and g are asymptotically equal, denoted f ∼ g, if f(n)g(n) → 1 as n→∞.
We begin by considering the simplest non-trivial toroidal grid – the n-vertex cycle:
Lemma 9. Let Ct be a configuration on the n-vertex cycle (n ≥ 3). The follow statements hold.
(1) Ct contains no weak defectors.
(2) A weak cooperator in Ct is either isolated, or has a neighbour that is either an isolated defector, or
has a cooperator neighbour with a defector neighbour.
(3) Ct+1 contains no isolated defectors.
Proof. Statement 1 follows from observing that a weak cooperator must have a defector neighbour. However,
such a neighbour has score at most 1, which is strictly less than a defector with a cooperator neighbour.
Let v be a weak cooperator that is neither isolated nor has a neighbour that is an isolated defector. Since
v is weak it must have at least one defector neighbour. Since this defector is not isolated, then it has score
1+ . Since v is weak but not isolated, it must be that a cooperator neighbour scores at most 1. This implies
that such a neighbour has a defector neighbour.
Statement 3 follows from Statement 1 and by observing that both neighbours of an isolated defector are
weak and so at least one of them will change to a defector by the end of round t. 
Lemma 10. If P is a maximal induced path of cooperators in C0 on 4 < t < n−2 vertices, then the interior
vertices of P are initial persistent cooperators.
Proof. The interior vertices of P are strong in C0. An end vertex of a maximal induced t > 2 vertex path of
cooperators is weak if and only if it has a neighbour that is an isolated defector. Since there are no isolated
defectors in Ci for all i > 0, any induced path of at least 3 cooperators will be strong in C1. 
Theorem 11. If C0 is a configuration on the n-vertex cycle then there exists i such that Wi = ∅.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 9 that the number of defectors increases monotonically at the end of each
round. Since the number of defectors is bounded above by n, it follows that there exists i ≥ 0 such that
Wi = ∅. 
Corollary 12. The Prisoner’s Dilemma process terminates for all initial configurations of the n-vertex
cycle.
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Since the Prisoner’s Dilemma process terminates for all initial configurations of the n-vertex cycle, we may
consider rf , the density of cooperators in the stable configuration. When we consider C0 formed by assigning
each vertex to independently be a cooperator with fixed probability p ∈ (0, 1) we find upper and lower bounds
for expected value of rf as a function of p.
By employing methods similar to previous work in this area, we arrive at the following result.
Theorem 13 (Guzma´n Pro, Janssen [13]). Consider the PD process on the n-vertex cycle where C0(v) = 1
with probability p ∈ (0, 1) for all v ∈ V (G).
3p5 − 2p6 + o(1) < E(rf ) < p− p(1− p)2 − 2p2(1− p)2 + o(1).
Proof. Begin by observing that a configuration of the cycle in which each vertex is a cooperator is stable,
and a configuration in which a single vertex is a defector becomes stable when exactly one of the neighbours
of the defector changes to be a defector. Consider a path, P , on k + 2 < n vertices in the n-vertex cycle
where the ends of the path are defectors and the interior vertices are all cooperators. The expected number
of such paths in C0 is given by np
k(1 − p)2. If k < 3 then every vertex of P will be a defector in Cf . If
k > 4, then at most k vertices of P will be cooperators in Cf . If k = 3 then at most three vertices of P will
be cooperators in Cf . If k = 4 then at most 4 vertices of P will be cooperators in Cf . Therefore
E(rf ) <
n2pn + n(n− 2)pn−1(1− p) +∑n−2k=3 nkpk(1− p)2
n
< npn + (n− 2)pn−1(1− p) +
∞∑
k=3
kpk(1− p)2
By the method of generating functions we find that
∑∞
k=3 kp
k(1− p)2 = p− p(1− p)2− 2p2(1− p)2. Further
we observe that npn + (n− 1)pn−1(1− p)→ 0 as n→∞. Thus we conclude.
E(rf ) < p− p(1− p)2 − 2p2(1− p)2 + o(1).
To find a lower bound, notice that if k > 4, then at least k − 2 vertices of P will be cooperators in Cf .
Therefore
E(rf ) >
n2pn + n(n− 2)pn−1(1− p) +∑n−1k=5 n(k − 2)pk(1− p)2
n
= npn + (n− 2)pn−1(1− p) +
n−1∑
k=5
(k − 2)pk(1− p)2
Notice that npn+(n−2)pn−1(1−p)→ 0 as n→∞. Since ∑n−1k=5(k−2)pk(1−p)2n > 3p5−2p6, we conclude
that
3p5 − 2p6 + o(1) < E(rf ) ≤ p− p(1− p)2 − 2p2(1− p)2 + o(1).

Theorem 14. Consider the PD process on the n-vertex cycle where C0(v) = 1 with fixed probability p ∈ (0, 1)
for all v ∈ V (G).
3p5(1− p)2 ≤ rf ≤ p
asymptotically almost surely.
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Proof. Let Cn = v1, v2, . . . , vn be the cycle on n vertices. Let Xi be the indicator variable that is 1 if vi
becomes a persistent collaborator at some point during the process. By Lemma 10, a path of 5 cooperators
in C0 will have its internal vertices be cooperators for all subsequent rounds. Thus, vi will be an initial
persistent collaborator if it is an internal vertex of a maximal induced path of cooperators of length 5.
Therefore Pr(Xi = 1) > 3p
5(1 − p)2. We note that this inequality is strict as there are other ways for
a vertex to be a persistent collaborator other than being an internal vertex of a maximal induced path
cooperators of length 5. For example, such a vertex could be an internal vertex of a maximal induced path
of cooperators of length 3 that is surrounded by non-isolated collaborators.
Let X =
∑
Xi. By linearity of expectation E(X) > 3np5(1 − p)2. Let p′ = Pr(Xi = 1) and let  =
p′ − 3p5(1− p)2 > 0. Note that ∑i V ar(Xi) = np′(1− p′). By Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr(X ≤ 3np5(1− p)2) ≤ Pr(|X − E(X)| ≥ n)
=
∑
V ar(Xi) +
∑
i 6=j Cov(Xi, Xj)
(n)2
=
np′(1− p′) +∑
i 6=j
Cov(Xi, Xj)
 · 1
(n)2
.
Observe that if d(vi, vj) ≥ 7 then Cov(Xi, Xj) = 0. Therefore
∑
i6=j Cov(Xi, Xj) has at most 14n non-zero
terms. Since each of these terms is bounded above by 1, we conclude
∑
i 6=j Cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ 14n. Therefore
Pr(|X − E(X)| ≥ n) ≤ np
′(1− p′) + 14n
2n2
=
p′(1− p′) + 14
2n
.
Since p is constant, this expression goes to 0 as n→∞. Therefore, a.a.s., X = E(X)(1+o(1)). This implies,
a.a.s., rf ≥ 3p5(1− p)2.
Observe that by Lemma 9 each defector in C0 is an initial persistent defector. Let Yi be the indicator variable
that is 1 is vi is a persistent defector at some point during the process. Since vi will be an initial persistent
defector if vi is a defector, then Pr(Yi = 1) > (1−p). As before, we note that this inequality is strict as there
are other ways for a vertex to become a persistent defector. For example, any cooperator that transitions to
become a defector will be a persistent defector. Let q′ = Pr(Yi = 1) and  = q′− (1− p) > 0. We proceed as
in the previous case, noting that Cov(Yi, Yj) = 0 for all i 6= j. Therefore, a.a.s., the final density of defectors
is at least (1− p) + o(1). Therefore a.a.s., rf ≤ p. 
We now consider the behaviour of rt for various regimes of p on the n × n toroidal grid. In particular, we
examine two cases: p as a fixed constant and p as a function of n. In the former case we follow a similar
argument to that of Theorem 14 to find a lower bound for rf . In the latter case we consider the growth of
small clusters of collaborators in an infinite field of defectors to find bounds on rf when p(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
Theorem 15. Consider the PD process on the n×n toroidal grid where C0(v) = 1 with probability p ∈ (0, 1)
for all v ∈ V (G). Asymptotically almost surely rt > p13 for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Let Xi be the indicator variable for the property that vi is a collaborator with no isolated defector
at distance at most two. We note by Corollary 3 that if Xi = 1, then vi is an initial persistent cooperator.
Observe that if each vertex in N [vi]∪N2[vi] is a cooperator in C0, then Xi = 1. Therefore Pr(Xi = 1) > p13.
We note that this inequality is strict as there are local configurations other than an entire closed second
neighbourbood as cooperators that would satisfy the conditions required to have Xi = 1.
Let X =
∑
Xi. By linearity of expectation E(X) > n2p13. Since p is a fixed constant, this quantity goes
to infinity as n → ∞. Let p′ = Pr(Xi = 1). Notice that p′ is a fixed constant in (p13, 1). Note that
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∑
i V ar(Xi) = n
2p′(1− p′). Let  = p′ − p13 > 0. By Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr(X ≤ p13n2) ≤ Pr(|X − E(X)| ≥ n2)
=
∑
V ar(Xi) +
∑
i 6=j Cov(Xi, Xj)
(n2)2
=
V ar(X) +
∑
i 6=j Cov(Xi, Xj)
(n2)2
=
n2p′(1− p′) +∑
i6=j
Cov(Xi, Xj)
 · 1
(n2)2
.
Consider a pair of vertices vi, vj such that d(vi, vj) ≥ 8. Since the value of Xi is determined by strategies of
vertices at distance no more than 4 from vi, it follows that Cov(Xi, Xj) = 0. Thus
∑
i 6=j Cov(Xi, Xj) has
at most 113n2 non-zero terms, as in the toroidal grid each vertex has 113 vertices at distance no more than
7. Since each of these terms is bounded above by 1, we conclude
∑
i 6=j Cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ 113n2.
Pr(|X − E(X)| ≥ n2) ≤ n
2p′(1− p′) + 113n2
2n4
=
p′(1− p′) + 113
2n2
.
Since each of p′ and  are constant, this quantity goes to 0 as n→∞. Therefore a.a.s, rf ≥ p13. 
We turn now to studying the process when p is taken to be a function of n rather than as a fixed constant.
When p is taken to be a constant, any k-cluster of collaborators can be expected to appear given sufficiently
large n. However, by taking p as a function of n, we can, in a sense, control the types of k-clusters that
are expected to appear as n → ∞. By choosing p(n) sufficiently small so that 5-clusters of cooperators are
not expected to appear, we may use our observations about the growth of small clusters of cooperators to
predict the final number of cooperators. Similarly, by choosing p(n) sufficiently large so that 2-clusters of
defectors are not expected to appear, we may use our observations about the growth of 1-clusters of defectors
to predict the final number of defectors given a fixed value of p.
In studying k-clusters in an initial configuration, we note that any k-cluster K may be uniquely indexed by
the vertex v ∈ K such that of the vertices in the bottom-most row of K, v is the vertex in the left-most
column. We call such a vertex the lower left corner of K.
We note that, though the number of cooperators in a k-cluster is fixed by definition (i.e., k), the number of
defectors adjacent to a vertex of K is not. The number of defectors on the perimeter of K depends on the
particular shape. For example, the number of defectors on the perimeter of a 3-line of collaborators is 8,
but the number of defectors on the perimeter of a 3-corner of collaborators is 7. However, we note that for
an k, the number of defectors adjacent to a vertex of k-cluster of collaborators is bounded by 3k, as each
collaborator of the k-cluster has at most 3 defector neighbours (when k > 1).
Lemma 16. Consider the PD process on an n×n toroidal grid where C0(v) = 1 with probability p = p(n)→ 0
as n→∞. Let K be a k-cluster of cooperators. The expected number of copies of K in C0 is asymptotically
equal to n2pk.
Proof. Assume p = p(n) → 0 as n → ∞. If K is a k-cluster of cooperators, then the probability that a
particular vertex is the lower left corner of a copy of K is pk(1− p)c, where c is the number of defectors on
the perimeter of K. Let Xi be the indicator variable that is 1 if vi is the lower left corner vertex of a copy
of K in C0. Let X =
∑
Xi. By linearity of expectation, E(X) = n2pk(1− p)c ∼ n2pk. 
Lemma 17. Consider the PD process on an n× n toroidal grid where C0(v) = 1 with probability p = p(n).
If p n− 2k , then a.a.s. there are no k-clusters of cooperators in C0.
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Proof. Notice that a k-cluster situated in a grid is a fixed polyomino with k cells. Let αk be the number of
polyominoes of order k. Assume p n− 2k .
By Markov’s inequality, the probability that there is at least one k-cluster is bounded above by αkp
kn2.
If p n− 2k , then αkpkn2 → 0 as n→∞. Therefore, a.a.s., there are no k-clusters in C0. 
Lemma 18. Consider the PD process on an n× n toroidal grid where C0(v) = 1 with probability p = p(n).
Let k be a positive integer and K be a k-cluster of cooperators. If p  n− 2k and p(n) → 0 as n → ∞, then
the number of copies of K in C0 is n
2pk(1 + o(1)) a.a.s..
Proof. Assume that p = p(n) such that p n− 2k and p(n)→ 0 as n→∞. Let Xi be the indicator variable
that is 1 if vi is the lower left corner of a copy of K in C0. Let X =
∑
Xi, be the number of copies of K
in C0. For vertices vi and vj we examine Cov(Xi, Xj). There are three cases depending on the distance
between vi and vj .
If vi and vj are sufficiently far apart so that there may be a copy of K whose lower left vertex and is vi
and one whose lower left vertex is vj such that their respective borders of width 1 do not intersect, then
Cov(Xi, Xj) = 0. How far vi and vj must be apart depends on K. Regardless, however if they are at
distance at least k + 2 then their respective borders of width 1 do not intersect.
If vi and vj are sufficiently far apart so that there may be a copy of K whose lower left vertex is vi and
one whose lower left vertex is vj such that there respective borders of width 1 intersect, then E(XiXj) =
p2k(1− p)2c−d, where d is the number of common defectors in the intersecting borders of width 1. Thus
Cov(Xi, Xj) = E(XiXj)− E(Xi)E(Xj)
= p2k(1− p)2c−d − (pk(1− p)c) (pk(1− p)c)
= p2k(1− p)2c−d − p2k(1− p)2c.
We note that this difference is maximised when these two copies of K have borders who intersect in the
maximum number of defector vertices. Let d′ be the maximum number of perimeter defector vertices in
which a pair of copies of K may intersect. Therefore in such a case
Cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ (p2k(1− p)2c−d′)− (p2k(1− p)2c) = p2k(1− p)2c−d′(1− (1− p)d′)
Further, note that when K is fixed, for a fixed vertex vi there are a constant number, cK < 4k
2 of vertices,
vj , such that vi and vj are sufficiently far apart so that there may be a copy of K whose lower left vertex is
vi and one whose lower left vertex is vj such that their respective borders of width 1 intersect. The upper
bound on cK comes by observing that for fixed vi, we have that vj must be at distance at most 2k from vi.
Since cK , c and d
′ are constant with respect to k, and since p  n− 2k and p(n) → 0 as n → ∞ we observe
that
cKn
2p2k
[
(1− p)2c−d′(1− (1− p)d′)
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
Finally, if vi and vj are sufficiently close so that a copy of K whose lower left vertex is vi will intersect with
copy of K or its border whose lower left vertex is vj , then XiXj = 0, as both vi and vj cannot simultaneously
be lower left vertices of a copy of K. In this case Cov(Xi, Xj) = −p2k(1− p)2c. As in the previous case we
note that as K is fixed then for a fixed vertex vi, there are a constant number, c
′
K of vertices, vj , such that
vi and vj are sufficiently close so that a copy of K whose lower left vertex is vi will intersect with copy of K
whose lower left vertex is vj . As in the previous case, we note that c
′
K < 4k
2. Since c′K and c are constant
with respect to k, and since p n− 2k and p(n)→ 0 as n→∞ we observe that
c′Kn
2[−p2k(1− p)2c]→ 0 as n→∞.
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From these three cases we conclude ∑
i 6=j
Cov(Xi, Xj)→ 0 as n→∞.
Let  =
(
1
n2pk
) 1
4
. Observe that → 0 as n→∞, that 2n2pk →∞ as n→∞, and that∑
V ar(Xi) = n
2pk(1− p)c (1− pk(1− p)c) .
By Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr(|X − E(X)| > E(X)) ≤
∑
V ar(Xi) +
∑
Cov(Xi, Xj)
(E(X))2
≤
∑
V ar(Xi)
2n4p2k
+
∑
Cov(Xi, Xj)
2n4p2k
=
n2pk(1− p)c (1− pk(1− p)c)
2n4p2k
+
∑
Cov(Xi, Xj)
2n4p2k
=
(1− p)c (1− pk(1− p)c)
2n2pk
+
∑
Cov(Xi, Xj)
2n4p2k
Since c is a positive constant and p→ 0 as n→∞,
(1− p)c (1− pk(1− p)c) ≤ 1
Thus, by the above remarks
(1− p)c (1− pk(1− p)c)
2n2pk
+
∑
Cov(Xi, Xj)
2n4p2k
→ 0 as n→∞.
Therefore, a.a.s., X = E(X)(1 + o(1)). That is, the number of copies of K in C0 is n2pk(1 + o(1)) a.a.s.. 
Theorem 19. Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma process on an n × n toroidal grid where C0(v) = 1 with
probability p = f(n).
(1) If p n− 23 , then a.a.s. rf = 0;
(2) if n−
2
3  p n− 12 , then a.a.s. rf = 20p3(1 + o(1));
(3) if n−
2
4  p n− 25 , then a.a.s. rf ≤ 20p3(1 + o(1)) + 19 · 2log4(n)p4(1 + o(1));
(4) if 1− n−1  p 1− n−2, then a.a.s. rf = (2p− 1)(1 + o(1)); and
(5) if 1− n−2  p, then a.a.s. rf = 1.
Proof. Recall that a k-cluster situated in a grid is a fixed polyomino with k cells. For k > 0 let αk be the
number of polyominoes of order k. From [1] we get that α3 = 19 and α4 = 63.
(1) If p  n− 23 , then by Lemma 17 a.a.s. there are no k-clusters of cooperators for k > 2 in C0. Since
each 1- and 2-cluster of cooperators evolves into an empty cluster, Cf contains no cooperators.
(2) If n−
2
3  p n− 12 then by Lemma 17 a.a.s. there are no k-clusters of cooperators for k > 3 in C0.
Since each 1- and 2-cluster of cooperators evolves in to an empty cluster, rf is completely determined
by the number of 3-clusters of cooperators.
We show, a.a.s., that none of the n2 sub-squares of the grid with dimension 10 × 10 contains more
than one 3-cluster. For a fixed 10 × 10 sub-square of the grid, the probability that it contains t
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3-clusters is bounded above by α3
(
100
t
)
p3t. Therefore the probability that it contains two or more
3-clusters is bounded above by
p′ =
33∑
i=2
6
(
100
i
)
p3i.
Let Xi be the indicator variable that is 1 if vi is the lower left vertex of a 10 × 10 sub-square that
contains two or more 3-clusters in C0. Let X =
∑
Xi. By linearity of expectation E(X) ≤ n2p′ =
n2
∑33
i=2 6
(
100
i
)
p3i. Since n2p3t → 0 as n → ∞ for all t ≥ 2, we observe that E(X) → 0 as n → ∞.
Therefore, by Markov’s inequality, a.a.s., none of the n2 sub-squares of the grid with dimension
10× 10 contains two or more 3-clusters.
A 3-cluster necessarily evolves in to an empty cluster or a stable 5-cluster (see Section 4). Therefore,
the growth of a 3-cluster is necessarily contained within a ball of radius two. Therefore, a.a.s., any
existing 3-cluster in C0 will grow as if it is growing within an infinite field of defectors.
By Lemma 18 a.a.s. there are 4n2p3(1 + o(1)) 3-corners and 2n2p3(1 + o(1)) 3-lines in C0. Each
3-corner evolves to a stable configuration with 5 collaborators with probability 12 and to an empty
cluster with probability 12 (see Section 4). Therefore the number of collaborators in Cf that arise
from a 3-corner is, a.a.s., 12 · 5 · 4n2p3(1 + o(1)). Each 3-line evolves to a stable configuration with 5
collaborators with probability 1 (see Section 4). Therefore the number of collaborators in Cf that
arise from a 3-corner is, a.a.s., 5 · 2n2p3(1 + o(1)). Therefore total number of cooperators in the
stable configuration is a.a.s. 20n2p3(1 + o(1)). Thus rf = 20p
3(1 + o(1)).
(3) Let n−
2
3  p n− 25 . By the previous arguments we may conclude that a.a.s. there are no k-clusters
for any k > 4. Similarly we may conclude that there are 2n2p3(1 + o(1)) 3-lines 4n2p3(1 + o(1))
3-corners, and α4n
2p4(1 + o(1)) 4-clusters.
To consider the growth of 4-clusters our goal is to show a.a.s. that the 4-clusters are sufficiently
spaced in C0 so that they each may grow as if they are contained within an infinite field of defectors.
We first show a.a.s. that none of the n2 sub-squares of the grid with dimension 2blog2(n)c×2blog2(n)c
contains a pair of clusters of collaborators of size at least 3. This implies a.a.s. that each 4-cluster
has a border of width at least 2blog2(n)c. We then show a.a.s. that the growth of each 4-cluster
is contained within a ball of radius blog2(n)c. Using these two facts we are able to examine each
4-cluster as if it is growing within an infinite field of defectors.
For a fixed 2blog2(n)c × 2blog2(n)c sub-square of the grid, the probability that it contains at least
two 3-clusters is bounded above by
dlog4(n)e∑
i=2
α3
(
4dlog4(n)e
i
)
p3i  6
dlog4(n)e∑
i=2
(
4dlog4(n)e)i
n
6i
5
< 6
dlog4(n)e∑
i=2
(
4dlog4(n)e
n
6
5
)i
.
For sufficiently large n, 4dlog
4(n)e
n
6
5
< 1. Therefore the largest term of this sum occurs at i = 2. Thus
dlog4(n)e∑
i=2
6
(
4dlog4(n)e
n
6
5
)i
< 6dlog4(n)e
(
4dlog4(n)e
n
6
5
)2
.
Let p′ = 6dlog4(n)e
(
4dlog4(n)e
n
6
5
)2
. Let Xi be the indicator variable that is 1 if vi is the lower left
corner of a 2blog2(n)c × 2blog2(n)c sub square of the grid that contains at least two 3-clusters.
Let X =
∑
Xi. By linearity of expectation E(X) < n2p′. Observe that n2p′ → 0 as n → ∞.
Therefore, by Markov’s inequality, a.a.s., none of the n2 sub-squares of the grid with dimension
2blog2(n)c × 2blog2(n)c contains a pair of clusters of collaborators of size at least 3. A similar
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argument shows that none of the n2 sub-squares of the grid with dimension 2blog2(n)c × 2blog2(n)c
contains a pair of 4-clusters or a 4-cluster and a 3-cluster.
As 1 and 2-clusters necessarily disappear after C1, each growing 4-cluster has a border of width at
least 2blog2nc in C2. By Corollary 7 the probability that the growth of a 4-cluster in an infinite field
of defectors is contained within in a ball of radius log2(n) is strictly bounded below by 1− 78
log2(n)/3
.
Let Yi be the indicator variable that is 1 if vi is the lower left corner of a 4-cluster whose growth
eventually escapes a ball of radius log2(n). Let Y =
∑
Yi. Pr(Yi = 1) <
7
8
log2(n)/3
. Recall that
a.a.s., the number of 4−clusters in C0 is α4n2p4(1 + o(1)). Therefore by linearity of expectation
E(Y ) <
(
7
8
log2(n)/3
)
α4n
2p4(1 + o(1)). This quantity goes to 0 as n → ∞. Therefore by Markov’s
inequality, a.a.s., each 4-cluster has a sufficiently large border to contain its growth.
Following the argument in 2, in Cf there are, a.a.s., 20n
2p3(1+o(1)) collaborators arising as a result
of 3-clusters in C0. Since the growth of each 4-cluster is, a.a.s., contained within a ball of radius
log2(n), the number of collaborators arising as a result of a single 4-cluster is, a.a.s., bounded above
by 2log4(n). Therefore the number of collaborators in Cf arising as a result of 4-clusters in C0 is
α4 · 2log4(n)p4(1 + o(1)). Thus, a.a.s., rf ≤ 20p3(1 + o(1)) + 19 · 2log4(n)p4(1 + o(1)).
(4) This follows similarly to 2 by letting q = 1 − p, applying Lemmas 17 and 18 with q in place of p,
and by observing that an isolated defector in an infinite field of cooperators necessarily grows to a
stable 2-cluster of defectors.
(5) This follows similarly to 1 by letting q = 1− p and applying Lemmas 17 and 18 with q in place of p.

4.1. Results of Simulation. We compare the results in Theorems 19, 15 and 13 to simulated data for the
process.
Simulation on the 1000×1000 toroidal grid yields the plots in Figures 8a and 8b. For each p ∈ {0.001, 0.002, . . . , 0.07}
and p ∈ {0.920, 0.921, . . . , 0.999}, respectively, there were ten simulations. The points in the plots give the
means of rf for each value of p. In each plot the curve gives the asymptotic prediction for rf given in
Theorem 19. In Figure 8a we see that rf is modeled by a cubic function of p for p ∈ {0.001, 0.002, . . . , 0.07}.
The deviation from the predicted values seen in figure can be explained by the asymptotic nature of the
result in Theorem 19. In particular, Theorem 19 predicts rf as n→∞, and not for any particular value of
n. In Figure 8b we see that rf is modeled by a linear function of p for p ∈ {0.920, 0.921, . . . , 0.999}.
Simulation on the 10000-vertex cycle yields the plot in Figure 8d. For each p ∈ {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.98, 0.99}
there were ten simulations. The points in the plot give the mean of rf for each value of p. In this plot the
curve gives the asymptotic lower bound and upper bounds for rf as predicted in Theorem 13. The curves
in this plot gives the theoretical asymptotic lower bound and upper bounds on rf predicted by Theorem 13.
Simulation on the 400×400 toroidal grid yields the plot in Figure 8c. For each p ∈ {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.98, 0.99}
there were ten simulations. The points in the plot give the mean of rf for each value of p. The curve in this
plot gives the theoretical asymptotic lower bound on rf predicted by Theorem 19. Though the result of the
simulation shows that the bound given in Theorem 15 is far from optimal, Theorem 15 represents one of the
few rigorous asymptotic lower bounds for such a process in the literature.
5. Conclusion
For the toroidal grid when 1 < T < 43 there is no guarantee that the process necessarily terminates. It is
possible that the configurations exhibit periodic behaviour with non-trivial period length. Such behaviour
is observed for other values of T and other updating schemes [13]. However our simulations suggests that
the process does always terminate on the toroidal grid when 1 < T < 43 . When the value of p is constrained
as in Theorem 19, it can be shown that the process terminates a.a.s..
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Figure 8. Experimental Results
The method used to give the bounds in Theorem 19 certainly can be extended examine values of p outside
the ranges considered in Theorem 19. However, to extend the analysis to include values of p for which
5-clusters can be expected to appear would require the study of the full set of a fixed polyomino with 5 cells,
One would need to consider how such polyominoes grow when governed by the updating process and how
such the growth of such polynominoes interacts with the growth of nearby polynominoes of smaller order.
As there are twelve such polyominoes [1], this approach is infeasible in practice.
In [5] the authors examine how asynchronous update schemes affect the evolution of one-dimensional multi-
agent systems. Our work examines an asynchronous update scheme in a 2D-multi-agent system. The
randomized asynchronous update scheme presented herein does not have an one-dimensional analogue that
is studied in [5]. This presents two research directions following our work: (1) how does the randomized
asynchronous update scheme considered in this work affect the evolution of one-dimensional multi-agent
systems; and (2) how do the asynchronous update schemes examined in [5] affect the evolution of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Process on toroidal grids.
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